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Preventive Justice, the Precautionary Principle and the Rule of Law
Jocelyn Stacey1
Modern public environmental law is a field largely premised on prevention. From the
1970s onward international and domestic environmental law has been shaped by the recognition
that strictly remedial approaches to environmental issues are not adequate for deterring
environmental harm and stemming serious environmental degradation. 2 The 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development helped to solidify four guiding principles for
public environmental law: polluter pays, sustainable development, prevention and precaution.3
Of these four principles, only polluter pays—the idea that she who causes the pollution should
bear its costs—is retributive. Sustainable development, an emerging and complex body of
international law, has a significant preventive component.4 It captures the idea that the present
generation has an obligation to future generations not to push the Earth’s ecological capabilities
to their limits. Prevention is the idea that we should take steps to prevent or mitigate foreseeable
harm to the environment. It is often implemented through the requirement of conducting an
environmental impact assessment prior to undertaking any regulatory activity. The fourth—and
the focus of this chapter—is the precautionary principle, which posits that a lack of scientific
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certainty should not prevent state action in the face of serious or irreversible threats to the
environment.
Despite its largely preventive orientation, environmental law has, with one exception,
remained distinct from the burgeoning field of preventive justice. The exception is the
precautionary principle, which has become a subject of interest and frequent skepticism amongst
preventive justice scholars. The precautionary principle is a central principle in environmental
law. Its centrality arises from the pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty in environmental
regulation; that is, our inability to reliably predict the consequences of our policy choices on
environmental and human health.5 The precautionary principle squarely addresses the question of
how we ought to proceed in the face of unavoidable uncertainty.
Preventive justice scholars have noted the temptation, particularly in the national security
context, to rely on a kind of “precautionary logic”6 by which extreme measures are taken in an
effort to avoid future, but uncertain, security threats. Counter-terrorism strategies that include
anticipatory or pre-emptive military strikes, civil control orders, and indefinite detention all
aimed at preventing future terrorist attacks have been characterized as part of a precautionary
approach to counter-terrorism. 7 While no government has outright attempted to adopt the
precautionary principle as a basis for security measures, public officials have relied on
precautionary rhetoric. In the environmental context, the precautionary principle operates to
justify state action even in the face of uncertainty. Preventive justice scholars thus worry that, in
the security context, the precautionary principle would justify severe liberty-infringing measures.
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For my own take on uncertainty in environmental law see: Jocelyn Stacey, ‘The Environmental Emergency and the
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This chapter explores the connection between the precautionary principle in
environmental law and preventive justice scholarship. It is written from the perspective of
environmental law. It has two aims. First, the chapter traces the claims about the precautionary
principle in the preventive justice literature back to their environmental roots. In doing so, it
situates the precautionary principle within broader environmental law debates about how the
principle ought to operate. Second, the chapter argues that the precautionary principle and
principles of preventive justice ought to be understood as part of the same rule-of-law project,
that is, the project of ensuring that all public decisions are publicly justified on the basis of core
constitutional principles.8 Understood in this way, both the precautionary principle and principles
of preventive justice seek to respect and enable the autonomy of individuals, understood as their
capacity to reason with the law. It is thus a mistake to think that the precautionary principle can
be transposed from the environmental context to the national security context. What the rule of
law requires in each context is distinct and these respective principles ought to be understood as
attempts to maintain our commitment to the rule of law even under the challenging conditions in
which we face uncertain future harm.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces the characterization of the
precautionary principle portrayed in the preventive justice scholarship. It argues that preventive
justice scholars view the precautionary principle as a particularly potent decision-making logic
with serious, negative consequences for the security context. The second part situates this partial
characterization of the precautionary principle within its environmental context. Drawing on
examples from Australia and Canada, it argues that, while there is some support for this
characterization, the principle’s influence has been far tamer in environmental law than is
represented by preventive justice scholars. The third and final part argues that the connection
between the precautionary principle and preventive justice comes at the foundational level of a
commitment to democratic governance under the rule of law. What this foundational
commitment requires in practice is necessarily context-dependent, such that both the
precautionary principle and principles articulated by preventive justice scholars should be

8

David Dyzenhaus, ‘Preventive Justice and the Rule-of-Law Project’ in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and
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understood as complementary, but not transferrable, attempts to maintain our commitment to the
rule of law even under conditions of uncertainty.
Part I. Precaution9 and Preventive Justice
Preventive justice scholars have noted the rhetorical parallels between the precautionary
principle in environmental law and the explanations that government officials have offered for
sweeping counter-terrorism measures.10 It is therefore understandable that preventive justice
scholars approach the precautionary principle with deep skepticism. They have come to
characterize the precautionary principle in the security context in particularly strong and
monolithic terms. For example, Carol Steiker writes,
‘the precautionary principle’, which holds that if an action or policy might cause
severe and irreversible harm to the public or the environment, the proponents of
the action should bear the burden of proof of no harm, in the absence of a
scientific consensus that the harm will not occur. The implications of widespread
adherence to an analogous principle in the preventive detention context are
sobering: we should expect to see large numbers of low-level terrorist suspects
detained, coupled with surveillance and/or detention of large numbers of people
who are simply members of ethnic or religious groups or organizations from
whom terrorists are commonly recruited. 11
Similarily Ashworth and Zedner write,
The benefit of [the precautionary] approach is that it licenses officials to take preventive
measures, particularly in cases where the potential harm is life-threatening or gravely
damaging to human safety or health. The problem is that the precautionary principle may
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“Precaution,” “the precautionary principle” and “precautionary approach” are used synonymously in this chapter.
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Carol S Steiker, ‘Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice’ in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and Patrick
Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 194, 208 (citations
omitted).
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license arbitrary and unfounded decision-making with serious adverse consequences for
individual liberties.12
Steiker, Ashworth and Zedner identify three potentially problematic aspects of the
precautionary principle: threat, command, and measures. First, they are concerned about the
nature of the threat that will trigger state action. Steiker highlights the necessarily speculative
nature of the future harm. And while Ashworth and Zedner focus on grave threats, others worry
that the precautionary principle will be invoked against trivial threats, far below the threshold of
serious and irreversible harm that is required in the environmental context.13 Elsewhere Zedner
worries about the indiscriminate application of precaution, stating that, unlike risk assessment,
precaution “treats all as possible sources of suspicion or threat.”14 Steiker rightly notes the
discriminatory ramifications of implementing sweeping counter-terror measures ostensibly based
on a precautionary approach.
Preventive justice scholars also emphasize the command imposed on the decision-maker.
They are especially concerned that the precautionary principle seems to compel or “license” the
decision-maker to take preventive action. 15 For Steiker, the decision-maker discharges her
obligations by reversing the burden of proof; that is, by requiring the affected party to show the
absence of harm, rather than requiring the government to show the possibility of harm.16 If the
burden is not met, then the decision-maker, on this view, has no option but to take action by, e.g.,
implementing heightened surveillance or increased detention practices.
This attention to the obligatory nature of the precautionary principle leads to further
concerns about the measures that follow from its implementation. Preventive justice scholars are
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Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford University Press, 2014), 120.
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rightly concerned about “serious adverse consequences for individual liberties.” Measures are
analysed and criticized on the basis of their proximity to the perceived threat or their
epistemological basis.17 Having determined that certain measures are precautionary—and thus
dubious—the next task for many preventive justice scholars is to determine whether such
measures can be justified on the basis of their effectiveness.18 Some preventive justice scholars
worry that precautionary measures are “arbitrary and unfounded”19 or “error prone.”20 Others
note the internal contradiction that the absence of evidence of effectiveness can serve as
justification for further and more invasive precautionary measures.21
Preventive justice scholars present the precautionary principle as a linear, compulsory
decision-making tool, one with striking ramifications in the national security context. As we
shall now see, this characterization has some basis in environmental law, but the principle’s
implementation and its potential are far more nuanced.

Part II. The Practice and Potential of Precaution in Environmental Law
In the environmental context, uncertainty about future environmental harm is often used
as an excuse for maintaining the status quo. By eliminating uncertainty as a legitimate basis for
inaction, the precautionary principle promises to help overcome a lack of political will to protect
the environment. 22 In the security context, by stark contrast, there is seemingly no such lack of
political will. It is thus understandable that preventive justice scholars approach the
precautionary principle with serious reservations. At the same time, however, the precautionary
principle has generated a vast and rich environmental jurisprudence and scholarship that is not
represented in the preventive justice literature. The aim of this part is to trace the preventive
17

Stern and Wiener, above n 7, 397 and 403-4; Lennon, above n 14, 48-50; Tulich, above n 7, 232.
Stern and Wiener, above n 7, 415 ff.
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Ashworth and Zedner, above n 12.
20
Tulich, above n 7, 231.
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Rebecca Ananian-Welsh infra; Zedner, Security, above n 6, 84-5; Goldsmith, above n 6, 159.
22
In the original German context, the precautionary principle was a justification for interventionist state action:
Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron, ‘The History and Contemporary Significance of the Precautionary
Principle’ in Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan
Publications, 1994) 12, 16.
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justice characterization of the precautionary principle back to its environmental law origins, to
better understand the debates that the principle has generated and to set the stage for the
argument that the precautionary principle is fundamentally connected to the rule of law.
The most widely accepted version23 of the precautionary principle is that contained in the
Rio Declaration:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.24
In this formulation the precautionary principle simply requires that decision-makers attend to the
scientific uncertainty inherent in their regulatory decisions. Consistent with the preventive justice
characterization, the Rio Declaration requires a threat of serious or irreversible harm for the
principle to apply.25 Notably, however, the command imposed by the Rio Declaration version of
precaution is that decision-makers not use uncertainty as a basis for inaction.26 Far from the
strong, compulsory version of precaution articulated by preventive justice scholars, the Rio
Declaration version of the precautionary principle does not compel decision-makers to take any
action. It is simply an admonition to attend to the unavoidable limits of our ability to predict the
effects of actions on the environment. Nor does the Rio Declaration mention any connection to
reversing the burden of proof. Finally, the Rio Declaration notes the need for cost-effective
measures, though it is silent on the details. Indeed, a huge range of measures can flow from the
precautionary principle: e.g. delaying a decision to allow potentially environmentally harmful
actions in order for more study or monitoring to occur, requiring certain mitigation measures on
activities, or prohibiting certain activities or pollutants.
23

Sands and Peel, above n 3, 228; Daniel Bodansky, ‘Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle’ in David D Caron,
Harry N Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 381, 381 (one of
the ten commandments of environmental law).
24
Rio Declaration, above n 3.
25
There are some versions of the precautionary principle that set a lower threat, e.g. Convention on the Ban of the
Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of their Transboundary Movements within Africa,
opened for signature 30 January 1991, 30 ILM 773 (entered into force 22 April 1998) art 3(f), but these are rare.
26
Again, there are some variations that impose stronger requirements on decision-makers, e.g. Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, opened for signature 22 September 1992, 32 ILM
1069 (entered into force 17 January 2000) art 2(2)(a), but these are less common than the Rio Declaration version.
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It is the Rio Declaration version of the precautionary principle that has been widely
incorporated into domestic law around the world.27 This chapter cannot offer a comprehensive
account of the vast practice and implementation of the precautionary principle worldwide. What
it can do, however, is use two example countries—Australia and Canada—as snapshots for the
practice and academic debates over the potential for the precautionary principle. 28 In both
Canada and Australia, the Rio Declaration version of the precautionary principle has been
incorporated into environmental law and policy. The countries provide useful comparator
examples: on the one hand, the precautionary principle in Australia has generated sustained
jurisprudential and academic engagement.29 By way of contrast, there is a strong sense that the
principle has yet to do any meaningful work in shaping environmental law in Canada.30
Canada
The Canadian legal perspective demonstrates the temptation to view the precautionary
principle in black-and-white, all-or-nothing terms. On the one hand, some Canadian courts take a
similar view to that of preventive justice scholars; that is, they think that the precautionary
principle compels particular action. In the context of judicial review of environmental
assessment decisions, for example, the Canadian Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal
repeatedly state that the precautionary principle would have “paralyzing effects” because it

27

Jacqueline Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice (The Federation Press, 2005) 17 (on the Rio Declaration
as marking the “arrival” of the precautionary principle); Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Review: Laws of Fear: Beyond the
Precautionary Principle’ (2006) Modern L Rev 288, 289-90 (on the widespread incorporation of the Rio Declaration
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28
Australia and Canada both present hard cases for environmental law and policy in that they have similar frontier
mentalities where wilderness protection and natural resource exploitation often clash.
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See Inter-governmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE), 1 May 1992 and ESD Steering Committee,
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,
1992).; Environmental Protection Act 1970 (Vic); Gene Technology Act, 2000 (Cth); Protection of the Environment
Administration Act 1991 (NSW); Ozone Protection Act, 1989 (Cth). For academic commentary on the extensive
engagement with the principle in Australia see: Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative
Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007), ch 4.
30
This is despite an early and strong statement by the Supreme Court of Canada that the precautionary principle, as
approaching a principle of customary international law, is a background norm for interpreting domestic
environmental law: 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town) 2001 SCC 40. Chris
Tollefson, ‘A Precautionary Tale: Trials and Tribulations of the Precautionary Principle’, (A Symposium on
Environment in the Courtroom: Key Environmental Concepts and the Unique Nature of Environmental Damage),
Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2012), 17. Fisher notes related concerns about the justiciability of the
principle in the United Kingdom courts: Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ (2001) 13(3)
Journal of Environmental Law 315.
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would require prohibiting development. 31 This claim is not supported by the Rio Declaration,32
the language of Canadian environmental assessment legislation, 33 nor any sophisticated
scholarship on the precautionary principle.34 By assuming a “compulsory” or a strong version of
precaution and refusing to invoke it, the Canadian federal courts have stifled the judicial
development of the principle.
At the same time, Canadian courts have also assumed the opposite interpretation of the
precautionary principle: that the principle is simply the application of common sense.35 For
example, in Morton v Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and Marine Harvest Canada, 36 a
concerned scientist sought judicial review of a license that permitted the transfer of potentially
diseased salmon from a hatchery to a fish farm located in coastal waters. The scientific
uncertainty pertained to the causal relationship between a particular disease agent, for which the
transferred salmon tested positive, and a well-documented fatal disease in western Canada’s
iconic wild salmon populations. The Federal Court noted the scientific debate over the issue, but
argued that the relevant Regulation’s prohibition on activities that “may be harmful” to wild fish
populations should be interpreted generously, in line with the precautionary principle.37 The
Court held that the condition of the license that allowed the transfer of “low risk” fish was
inconsistent with the Regulation and, by issuing the license, the Minister “did not err on the side
of caution.”38 While the decision is precautionary in the ordinary sense of the word, it is far from
obvious that the precautionary principle itself did any distinctive work in the decision. Ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation would seem to have led the Court to reach the same
31

Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2003] FCJ 703, [24];
Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (Attorney General), [2008] FCJ No 324, [32];
Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney General), [2014] FCJ No 515, [83] (repeating the quote, although the
Court in this case actually does properly apply the precautionary principle despite its reluctance to name it as such).
The decision, however, is overturned on appeal with no reference to the precautionary principle: Ontario Power
Generation Inc. v. Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186.
32
Above n 24.
33
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52, s 4.
34
Influential regulatory scholar Cass Sunstein has perpetuated this characterization of the principle, but it is a
caricature. See Cass R Sunstein, Laws of Fear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 457 and Jaye Ellis,
‘Overexploitation of a Valuable Resource? New Literature on the Precautionary Principle’ (2006) 17 European
Journal of International Law 445; Fisher, above n 27.
35
This understanding of the precautionary principle persists in the Australian context as well: e.g. Leatch v National
Parks and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council, (1993) 81 LGERA 270.
36
2015 FC 575.
37
Ibid [97].
38
Ibid [46].
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conclusion that a low-risk transfer “may be harmful.” Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Court
invoked the precautionary principle to help adjudicate known scientific risks. The issue about the
causal connection between the disease agent and disease was known, documented and supported,
if not conclusively, by scientific evidence. In other words, though a precautionary success story,
Morton is remarkably tame.
Australia
The lack of serious Canadian judicial development of the principle has led environmental
law scholars to turn abroad to Australia where the courts have contemplated a distinctive role for
the principle.39 The key Australian decision on the precautionary principle is Telstra v Hornsby
Shire Council, a decision by Chief Justice Preston of the New South Wales Land and
Environment Court.40 Telstra was a review on the merits of a local council’s refusal to grant
Telstra a development approval to install mobile phone antennae on a building. Concerns were
raised before the local council about the possible public health effects of radiofrequency and
electromagnetic energy from the proposed mobile phone towers. Preston CJ attempted to
synthesize precautionary principle jurisprudence and articulate a specific and comprehensive test
for applying the precautionary principle in the domestic context.41
In his view, the precautionary principle requires the application of a three-part test. The
first step, set out in the decision, is to determine whether two threshold criteria are met for the
principle to be invoked: (i) the existence of a threat and (ii) the existence of scientific uncertainty
about such a threat. 42 While Preston CJ set out broad-ranging considerations for the
determination of the existence of a threat, he maintained that “[t]he threat of environmental
damage must be adequately sustained by scientific evidence.”43 Similarly, Preston CJ stated that
the scientific uncertainty must be grounded in “reasonable scientific plausibility.”44 Once the
39

See, in particular, Chris Tollefson and Jamie Thornback, ‘Litigating the Precautionary Principle in Domestic
Courts’ (2008) 19 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 33.
40
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For detailed analysis of this case, see: Fisher above n 29, 155-160 and Jacqueline Peel, ‘When (Scientific)
Rationality Rules: (Mis)Application of the Precautionary Principle in Australian Mobile Phone Tower Cases Telstra
Corporation Limited v Hornsby Shire Council’ (2007) 19(1) Journal of Environmental Law 103.
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Telstra above n 40 [128].
43
Ibid [134].
44
Ibid [148], relying on Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules,
Oxford University Press, 2005.
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threshold is met, Preston CJ reasoned, the burden shifts to the proponent of the activity to
demonstrate that the threat does not exist or is negligible. Assuming the proponent cannot
discharge this burden, the final step is for the judge to treat the threat as a reality and determine
the appropriate precautionary measures through a proportionality analysis.45 He held that, in this
case, the requirement of serious or irreversible environmental damage was not met and thus there
was no basis for applying the precautionary principle.46
These brief snapshots of the precautionary principle in practice in Canada and Australia
confirm that many of the claims of preventive justice scholars are grounded in environmental law.
The principle is often portrayed as commanding specific and severe precautionary measures: e.g.
a ban on development. The Telstra framework commands a reversed burden of proof that, should
it not be met, requires precautionary action.47 At the same time, however, the decisions reflect a
narrow understanding of threat and uncertainty. Far from the vast world of unknown threats that
can arise in both environmental and security contexts, the influence of the precautionary
principle in environmental law has focused on filling relatively narrow existing gaps within
science.48 The precautionary principle, as applied, does not currently operate to challenge the
limits of scientific expertise, introduce different worldviews or sources of knowledge, or take
seriously the possibility of unknown-unknowns.
The “tame”49 version of the precautionary principle articulated in Telstra gives rise to
two questions about the limits and potential for the precautionary principle in environmental law.
The first is a question about the principle’s apparent requirement of reversing the burden of proof,
and the second is a question about the relationship between the precautionary principle and risk
45

Telstra above n 40, [150].
Ibid [184-5].
47
The consensus amongst Canadian legal academics is that the principle requires a reversed burden of proof: Jamie
Benidickson et al, Practicing Precaution and Adaptive Management: Legal, Institutional and Procedural
Dimensions of Scientific Uncertainty Final Report (Ottawa: Institute of the Environment, University of Ottawa,
2005) [unpublished]; Nathalie Chalifour, ‘A (Pre) Cautionary Tale About the Kearl Oil Sands Decision: The
Significance of Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, et al. v. Canada (Attorney-General) for the Future
of Environmental Assessment’ (2009) 5 McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy
251; David L VanderZwaag, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and
First Embraces’ (1998) 8 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 355.
48
Above n 27, 219.
49
Tollefson and Thornback above n 39, 38; John S. Applegate, ‘The Taming of the Precautionary Principle,’ (20022003) 27 William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review 13.
46
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assessment. As we shall now see, environmental law scholars have argued that the precautionary
principle has the potential to be much more than either a reversed burden of proof or a
modification to risk assessment. Perhaps it is this potential that is the source of anxiety for
preventive justice scholars.
Burden of Proof
The idea that the precautionary principle can be operationalized by reversing the burden
of proof reflects a judicial or quasi-judicial understanding of the principle. Yet front-line
environmental decisions are generally implemented in an administrative or regulatory context
that is quite unlike a criminal trial with a comparatively clear onus and standard of proof.50 In an
administrative context various ‘burdens’ arise with respect to providing specific information and
conducting analyses. It may be that in some cases, the precautionary principle will operate to
reverse or influence a burden of proof, but whether it does so requires careful attention to the
specific regulatory context.51 The notion that the precautionary principle requires the same thing
in every instance does not reflect the enormous range of environmental issues to which the
principle is relevant, or the diverse regulatory processes and decisions taken in response to these
issues.
Moreover, the reversed-burden-of-proof approach unduly narrows the innovative
possibilities for precautionary decision-making. Precautionary principle scholars have argued
that “the reversal of the burden of proof ‘abusively associated with the principle of precaution, is
more sensational than representative of reality.’”52 Most international environmental agreements
do not specify a reversed burden of proof,53 nor do many instances of domestic implementation

50

Judith Jones and Simon Bronitt, ‘The burden and standard of proof in environmental regulation: the precautionary
principle in an Australian administrative context’ in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones (eds), Implementing the
Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar Pub, 2006) 137.
51
Peel, above n 27 ,154-5. For example Wier v Canada (Minister of Health), 2011 FC 1322 (on the specific
requirements of the Pest Control Products Act, SC 2002, c 28, s 17 which require the Minister to make a
determination of whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the health or environmental risks of the
product are, or its value is, unacceptable.”); Environmental Defence Canada v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans), 2009 FC 878 (on the Species at Risk Act requirement that government officials act on whatever scientific
information is available at the time).
52
Ellis, above n 34, 459, including her translation of Julien Cazala, ‘Principe de précaution et procédure devant le
juge international’, in Le principe de précaution, 151 at 167.
53
Ibid.
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of the precautionary principle require a strict burden of proof approach.54 Some scholars have
noted the existence of far more creative institutional design, such as citizens’ assemblies and
independent public watchdogs, as examples of precautionary measures that bear little
relationship to a reversed-burden-of-proof interpretation.55 In short, for all its merits in the
context of judicial decision-making, it is far from clear that a reversed-burden-of-proof approach
reflects the administrative reality of environmental decision-making.
Precaution and Risk
Preventive justice scholars understand the precautionary principle as an exception to the
norm of risk assessment. Yet, as we have seen, in many instances the precautionary principle has
not supplied a distinctive decision-making framework. Rather, it is viewed as operating within a
risk assessment paradigm:56 e.g. recognizing a margin of error in risk assessment or “weighting
the risk of error in favour of the environment.”57 Yet defenders of the precautionary principle
argue that it has far greater potential to challenge status quo decision procedures and to challenge
dominant assumptions about our capacity to “manage” risk.58 Commentators point out that there
are multiple sources of uncertainty in environmental decision-making.59 Some of these sources
can be identified, measured and quantified with actuarial data and probabilistic analysis. But
some of these sources are inherent in the scientific process itself. There are questions that we do
not yet know to ask and these have particular salience when regulators are confronted with novel
innovations and potentially novel risks.60 From this perspective, the precautionary principle is an
“exception” to risk assessment only in that it focuses us to confront the inevitable incompleteness
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of any attempt to comprehensively quantify perceived risks. The important question, then, is
what a decision-maker ought to do with a necessarily partial risk assessment in hand.61
It is this vision—as a departure from risk assessment—that understandably makes
preventive justice scholars nervous about the precautionary principle. But what happens in this
gap between risk assessment and ultimate decision is precisely what can link the two projects of
preventive justice and the precautionary principle under the much more fundamental project of
maintaining the rule of law. In particular, it is the importance of procedure and reason-giving that
links the precautionary principle with preventive justice. For example, Fisher and Harding write
that the
principle regulates the reasons for a decision and the process by which a decision is
made….This is because regulating outcomes (beyond requiring decision makers to
pursue broad statutory goals) is logically impossible in cases of scientific uncertainty.62
In other words, the rationale for the precautionary principle does not lie in its substantive
legitimacy.63 The very conditions of uncertainty that require the precautionary principle preclude
us from evaluating the principle solely on its ability to generate effective outcomes.64 It would be
difficult, if not impossible to know when an unforeseen catastrophe has been avoided. Instead
defenders of the principle look to its potential to instantiate procedures through which a
community can collectively decide how to proceed in the face of uncertainty. Most defenders of
the precautionary principle therefore argue that it requires a more inclusive decision-making
process, which formalizes non-expert citizen participation and collective decision-making.65 This
enables the consideration of factors that do not fit into the language of risk assessment—factors
such as voluntariness, or whether potential risks may affect already marginalized populations—
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and it opens up the process of risk assessment to critical analysis from a variety of perspectives.
While the specific procedural requirements of the precautionary principle are vastly different
from what principles of preventive justice require in situations where serious libertyinfringement is at stake, we shall now see that both ought to be understood as essential to
maintaining and enabling the autonomy of individuals. In other words, both are attempts to
maintain our fundamental commitment to democratic governance under the rule of law, even
when faced with conditions of uncertainty.

Part III. Precaution, Prevention and the Rule-of-Law Project
The rule of law, as is often noted, is an “essentially contested concept.”66 The conception
of the rule of law advanced here is the idea that public officials must publicly justify their
decisions on the basis of core constitutional principles. It is a conception elaborated by David
Dyzenhaus, who states that its basic content is that
legislation must be capable of being interpreted in such a way that is can be enforced in
accordance with the requirements of due process: the officials who implement it can
comply with a duty to act fairly, reasonably and in a fashion that respects the equality of
all those who are subject to the law and independent judges are entitled to review the
decisions of these officials to check that they do so comply.67
On this view, what makes law law—and not merely an act of political power—is its compliance
with the rule of law. And it is this compliance that creates its own kind of legal legitimacy.68 This
is why public officials, such as those defending ‘advanced interrogation tactics’ in the aftermath
of 9/11, seek to justify their actions by pointing to their prior legal authorization. Dyzenhaus
calls this rule by law, the notion that an action is governed by law in the formal sense that it is
authorized by positive law.69 But Dyzenhaus argues that we cannot have rule by law without rule
of law, such that the failure of public actions to comply with the rule of law calls into question its
status as law.
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Preventive measures, notably in the counter-terrorism context, are often examples of
attempts to rule by law without the rule of law. Individuals facing significant infringements to
their liberty are deprived of basic rights of due process: e.g. the right to know the case against
them, the opportunity to properly contest this case before an independent tribunal.70 To the extent
these measures fail to comply with the rule of law, they lose their claim to legal legitimacy that
comes with the status of law.
Dyzenhaus defends this conception of the rule-of-law project on the basis that it respects
underlying values of liberty and equality. While the underlying rationales for the rule of law are
much debated, I have argued elsewhere that it respects and enables the autonomy of law’s
subjects, understood as their rational and self-determining capacity.71 In other words, law is
something worth having, not only because compliance protects individuals from arbitrary public
decisions, but also because compliance with the rule of law is what enables legal subjects to
reason with the law: to understand it and obey it, or to contest it and thereby participate in further
deliberations about what the law is and ought to be. When legislation complies with well-known
formal indicia of the rule of law (public, general, prospective, etc), is implemented congruently
with the stated rule, and is subject to review by independent judges the autonomy interests of
those subject to law are respected.72
However not all issues can be adequately addressed exclusively through legislative
provisions that meet these formal criteria. Complex environmental decisions require the exercise
of administrative discretion in response to technical and constantly evolving environmental
decisions. Public officials may need to move swiftly and decisively to protect individuals and
environmental health from pollutants, to halt activities that undermine our ecological support
systems, or to respond to an environmental catastrophe. Sound environmental decisions may
further require a solid grasp of scientific and ecological knowledge to recognize how
environmental issues—and our understanding of them—are constantly evolving. Similarly,
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responding to national security issues requires security expertise, decisive and coordinated action,
and often secrecy. All of these features militate against governing exclusively through
prospective and general legislative rules. Rather, responding to environmental issues and security
issues in order to prevent future harm requires considerable administrative infrastructure that
raises further questions about how administrative decision-making can nonetheless comply with
the rule of law.73
But when we understand the rule of law as serving the end of autonomy—that is, it
protects individuals from arbitrary decisions and allows them to reason with the law—then it is
possible to understand how both administrative decisions and emergency response decisions can
comply with the rule of law.74 When these decisions are publicly justified on the basis of core
constitutional principles, i.e. fairness and reasonableness, they will comply with the rule of law.75
This conception of the rule of law gives rise to the familiar requirements of due process
powerfully defended by preventive justice scholars, but importantly it can only be realized within
a deliberative democracy.76 While there are many theories of deliberative democracy, all share a
fundamental understanding of the individual as a responsible agent capable of reasoning with the
law.77
It is at this intersection—of the rule of law and deliberative democracy—that the
precautionary principle comfortably rests. The precautionary principle, in its best light, ought to
be understood as an attempt to preserve this reasoning capacity of legal subjects even under
conditions of uncertainty that challenge our ability to make fully informed public decisions. The
details of what the precautionary principle will require in order to fulfill the requirement of
public justification are necessarily context dependent. In broad strokes, however, they consist of
three features. These features better capture the nature of the relationship between the state and
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legal subject than any attempt to equate the precautionary principle with a reversed-burden-ofproof or any attempt to square the precautionary principle with a risk assessment framework. On
this view, the principle requires a decision-making procedure that enables collective reasoning
about how to proceed in the face of uncertainty, one that ensures that expert information is
exposed to public scrutiny. In other words, the process must be justified on the ground that it
promotes democratic deliberation. It requires detailed reasons by the decision-maker that identify
sources of uncertainty and the assumptions used to factor that uncertainty into the decision. And
it requires proper institutional channels for independent review. The result of these features is
that the precautionary principle operates to inform ordinary administrative law requirements of
fairness and reasonableness to ensure they reflect the reality of environmental decision-making.
These are simple, but demanding, requirements. In many instances they are met. But the
examples offered in this chapter demonstrate that public officials often fall short by failing to
offer reasons,78 or setting an untenable threshold for non-experts with legitimate concerns about
uncertain consequences.79
While these features might look quite different from what we would expect in the
preventive justice context when significant liberty interests are at stake, they nonetheless share
the essential characteristics of the rule of law. In their respective contexts, principles of
preventive justice and precaution ensure there is an open process in which those affected by the
decision have meaningful opportunities to be heard; they ensures affected individuals can contest
a decision that is of questionable legality before an independent tribunal. Moreover, these
principles operate to make democratic participation is internal to the requirements of the rule of
law. This conception respects the legal subject’s capacity to reason with the law, i.e. to
participate in the ongoing project of articulating and rearticulating the content of the law.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored the connections between the precautionary principle in the
preventive justice context and the precautionary principle in environmental law. It traced the
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roots of the preventive justice characterization of the precautionary principle through its
operation in the environmental context. It argued that, at least in Australia and Canada, the
reality of the precautionary principle is somewhat tamer than that imagined by preventive justice
scholars. The precautionary principle has not operated to address instances of true uncertainty in
the environmental context, it has not operated to displace a risk assessment paradigm, and it does
not typically compel any particular course of preventive action. At the same time, however, the
hopes of environmental law scholars remain high. They argue that the precautionary principle
has far more potential than is currently realized.
While a broader, reinvigorated precautionary principle may be a source of anxiety
amongst preventive justice scholars, this chapter has sought to assuage these concerns. It has
advanced an understanding of the precautionary principle that is wholly consistent with the
normative project of preventive justice, a project, as I understand it, of articulating how we can
maintain our commitment to the rule of law even under conditions of uncertainty about future
harm. It is thus misguided to claim that the precautionary principle can provide a basis for
sweeping preventive action in the national security context. The precautionary principle, in its
best light, is an essential part of realizing commitment to democratic governance under the rule
of law in the environmental context. And in this sense, it and preventive justice are
complementary efforts to both protect and enable the autonomy of those subject to the law.
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